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ABSTRACT
Fears about insufficient public education spending are often expressed in the area of higher
education, whereby it is often argued that increases in expenditures on crime‐related programs
crowd out expenditures on higher education. This view suggests that higher education and crime‐
related programs directly compete for government expenditures so that what one program gains
the other must lose as in a zero‐sum game. A competing hypothesis is that higher crime‐related
spending leads to higher taxes or public debt issuance or to lower spending on programs other than
higher education. We estimate a three‐equation model of spending on crime‐related programs,
spending on higher education, and the crime rate from which we directly test whether spending on
crime‐related programs and higher education influence each other. Our empirical analysis provides
weak evidence that crime‐related programs have crowded out spending on higher education.

INTRODUCTION
Widely observed increases in government spending on crime‐related programs have been a source
of great concern to proponents of public education spending. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1997)
reported that, in fiscal 1992, $94 billion was spent on crime‐related programs by state, local, and
federal governments. Crime‐related programs are activities that include police protection, jails and
prisons, and the courts. On a per capita basis in 1992, these governments spent $368, an increase of
59% over 1987. State and local governments account for roughly 85% of crime‐related
expenditures; however, from 1987 to 1992 the federal government increased its spending at more
than twice the rate of state and local governments.
In 1994, California voters passed the “three strikes and you’re out” legislation that has led many
proponents of education spending to fear that if it leads to higher crime‐related expenditures—
especially those related to incarceration of criminals—rapid reduction of expenditures on
education will surely follow. A RAND Corporation study (Greenwood et al. 1994) predicted that
implementation of California’s three strikes law will carry a price tag of $5.5 billion more in public
spending. With more states restricting parole, and as more states consider legislation similar to
California’s three strikes law, states appear to be undertaking growing commitments toward
funding of crime‐related programs.

Fears about insufficient public education spending are often expressed in the area of higher
education. Although some states may attempt to insulate elementary and secondary education
spending from other influences such as higher demands placed on corrections or law enforcement
by establishing minimum funding levels, higher education does not usually receive similar
protection. It is therefore not surprising that proponents of higher education spending view the
expansion of crime‐related spending with great trepidation. Whereas a commonly expressed
concern is that increases in higher crime‐related spending crowd out spending on public education,
another concern is that fewer education dollars today leads to higher future crime rates, which in
turn will further crowd out education spending in the future. This latter concern therefore asserts
that budget policy that skimps on education spending to fund more spending on crime‐related
programs is short‐run myopic in that it leads to higher longer run public spending on crime‐related
programs and still fewer future dollars on education.
This article examines the relationship between expenditures of public institutions of higher
education and public spending on crime‐related programs. As just discussed, it is often alleged that
education and crime‐related programs directly compete for government expenditures, so that what
one program gains the other must lose as in a zero‐sum game. Proponents of this view, then,
hypothesize that higher expenditures on crime‐related programs crowd out expenditures on higher
education. A competing hypothesis is that spending on these two public programs are unrelated.
For instance, higher crime‐related spending may lead to higher taxes or public debt issuance or to
reduction in spending on non‐crime‐related programs.
This article examines whether state and local expenditures on crime‐related programs crowd out
expenditures on public higher education. We examine the relationship between spending on higher
education and crime‐related programs between 1985 and 1992. Over this period, public spending
on crime‐related programs as a percentage of gross state product (GSP) rose from 0.93 to 1.17
while public spending on higher education as a percentage of GSP fell from 2.17 to 1.96. Whether
these trends are a result of crime‐related programs crowding out public spending on higher
education is an empirical question that is the focus of our article. We estimate a three‐equation
model of spending on crime‐related programs, spending on higher education, and the crime rate
from which we directly test whether spending on crime‐related programs and higher education
influence each other.

PREVIOUS STUDIES
Little research has been conducted in the area of crowding out among programs of state and local
governments. Our review of this literature indicates little or no evidence that supports the
hypothesis that higher crime‐related funding, or funding of any program for that matter, crowds
out funding on education. Brazer and McCarty (1987) tested the “municipal overburden”
hypothesis that high demand for municipal services lowers demand for public elementary and
secondary education. This hypothesis suggests that those areas, primarily urban, that require
relatively higher expenditures directed toward dealing with poverty, aged, housing, and crime will
have fewer resources available for education funding. No empirical support for the municipal
overburden hypothesis was found in cases of per pupil funding among school districts in
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Virginia. However, several cases were reported in which a positive

correlation exists between municipal and education spending, but these are opposite in direction to
the predictions of the municipal overburden hypothesis.
Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) argued that various groups compete for public funding and
therefore may potentially explain variation in public spending on higher education across states.
They used the proportion of a state’s population aged 18 years and younger as a proxy for the
competing interest group for K‐12 education and the proportion of the population aged 65 and
older as a proxy for Medicaid demand. They also considered the ratio of prisoners to population as
a proxy for the competing interest group for corrections. They found no evidence that public
spending on prisoners or K‐12 education crowds out public spending on higher education.
However, Hoenack and Pierro (1990) found that state spending on higher education was negatively
related to the proportion of a state’s population aged 65 and older—thus supporting the view that a
competing interest group succeeds in lowering spending on higher education.
Fossett and Wyckoff (1996) examined the impact of rising Medicaid spending on public elementary
and secondary education spending. Whereas an inverse relationship is found on data from 47 states
from 1980 through 1990, the results are not statistically significant and therefore provide no
support for the crowding out hypothesis. McCarty and Schmidt (1997) examined interactions
between six spending programs of state governments for evidence of crowding out over 1984 to
1994. The programs were elementary and secondary education, higher education, welfare, health
and hospitals, corrections, and miscellaneous. A vector autoregression (VAR) model was used to
examine whether changes in one program are correlated with changes in other programs, either
over time or contemporaneously. No evidence of crowding out was found and, in most cases, when
a program’s funding rose above trend, it had no significant influence on future spending on other
programs. However, deviations from trend had significant influences on future own‐program
spending, which may indicate that higher above‐trend spending in one program is funded through
higher tax revenues than through spending reductions in other programs.

EDUCATION AND CRIMERELATED SPENDING EQUATIONS
Expenditures on public programs are determined through the political process between voters and
policy makers within the budget (spending, tax, and debt) process. Education and crime‐related
expenditures are determined along with expenditures in other budget categories, and the total
budget is then the sum of its component parts. Various demographic (e.g., age distribution),
economic (e.g., unemployment rates), and cultural (e.g., past crime rates, ethnic diversity)
characteristics influence demand for various spending programs.
The following models of cross‐state higher education and crime‐related spending are estimated:
1. EDEXP i = f(CRIME i , Y i , EDUC i , METRO i , STUDENT i , COLLEGES i , DIVERSITY i ,
PARTY i )

OUTRATE i ,

2. CRIME i = f(EDEXP i , CR i , CCR i , DOM i , PARTY i )
3. CR i = f(CRIME i , DIVERSITYi,CR i–1, Yi, MEDAGE i , MID1 i , MID2 i , UE i , CUE i )
See Table 1 for a description of the variables and Table 2 for summary statistics of key variables.

Reviewing the spending trends in Table 2, we see that average higher education spending as a
percentage of GSP declined from 1985 to 1992 as average crime‐related spending rose as a
percentage of GSP. As percentages of GSP, crime‐related spending in 1992 averaged 1.17, with a low
of 0.69 (West Virginia) and a high of 1.92 (Florida). In 1985, crime‐related spending as a percentage
of GSP averaged 0.93, with a low of 0.60 (North Dakota) and a high of 1.55 (New York). Higher
education spending as a percentage of GSP in 1992 averaged 1.96, with a low of 0.99
(Massachusetts) and a high of 3.36 (Montana). In 1985, it averaged 2.17, with a low of 0.94 (Alaska)
and a high of 3.59 (Iowa). Over this period, then, public spending on higher education as a
percentage of GSP fell roughly 10 percent as public spending on crime‐related programs as a
percentage of GSP rose by roughly 26 percent.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables in the estimated equations reported below are higher educational
expenditures (as percentages of GSP), EDEXP i ; crime expenditures (as percentages of GSP), CRIME i ;
and the crime rate, CR i . The equations were also estimated using higher education expenditures per
student and crime expenditures per capita as dependent variables. To conserve space, these results
are not displayed in tables, but the differences resulting from the choice of dependent variables are
discussed below.
HIGHER EDUCATION SPENDING EQUATION
Crime‐related spending is included in the higher education spending equation to test the
hypothesis that the two are intertwined in the public budget. A negative relation would suggest that
higher crime‐related spending crowds out higher education spending. A positive relation would
suggest that higher spending on crime‐related programs leads to higher spending on higher
education or that states that allocate relatively many resources to crime‐related programs also
allocate relatively many resources to higher education programs. No relationship would suggest
that the two spending programs are not linked within the public budget.
The median‐voter theorem predicts that median voters dominate spending decisions, and therefore
median family income, Y i ,ishypothesized to be positively related to higher education spending.
Hoenack and Pierro (1990), Strathman (1994), and Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) found that per
capita (or median) income exerts significant and positive effects on higher education spending.
Voters with more education are hypothesized to vote for larger higher education budgets and
therefore a positive coefficient is hypothesized for EDUC i , percentage of population with at least
high school degrees. Population density, METRO i , measures the percentage of the population living
in metropolitan areas and, because production costs are commonly believed to be higher in
metropolitan areas, it is hypothesized to be positively related to education spending. The student
(in higher education) percentage of the population, STUDENT i , controls for cross‐state differences
in student populations and is hypothesized to exert positive influences on education spending
because higher values may reflect greater student and parental demands for education.

4

The relationship between numbers of institutions of higher education and educational expenditures
is theoretically indeterminate. Substantial economies of scale could be unexploited when there are
relatively many schools so that a greater number of schools is associated with higher expenditures.

But, a large number of schools could also be an indication of vigorous competition with educational
services delivered at lower cost. The Leviathan model of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) would
predict that fewer schools lead to greater higher education spending due to less intergovernmental
competition in the higher education market. The hypothesized sign on COLLEGES i , numbers of
public institutions per 1,000 students, is therefore an empirical question.
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The ethnic diversity of a state’s population, DIVERSE i , is expected to be positively related to
educational expenditures. An ethnically diverse population may require special or remedial
education programs that increase expenditures per pupil. An index of diversity was created for
each state using race/ethnic groups reported by the Census Bureau: White‐Hispanic, Black‐
Hispanic, American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut‐Hispanic, Asian Pacific Islander–Hispanic, White non‐
Hispanic, Black non‐Hispanic, Aleut non‐Hispanic, and Asian Pacific Islander non‐Hispanic. The
diversity index was calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of the population of each
group. The greater the diversity index, the less racially/ethnically diverse a state’s population. A
negative effect, or that a more diverse population leads to higher expenditures, is therefore
hypothesized.
Clotfelter (1976) found that states with higher rates of out‐migration of (higher education)
graduates will provide less support for student‐related spending. States with higher likelihood of
out‐migration were found to have lower per capita expenditures. This result is argued to be
consistent with the view that governments spend less when they anticipate higher benefit losses
due to out‐migration of graduates and thus suggests that higher education spending is consistent
with maximization of community welfare. Stratham (1994) also reported evidence that spending on
higher education by state legislatures is influenced by expected future losses in benefits due to out‐
migration. He also argued that tuition increases often make up for lower spending on higher
education due to out‐migration.
The rate of population out‐migration, OUTRATE i , measures the effect of people leaving the state on
higher‐education spending. Out‐migration of graduates reduces the benefits to the state of
providing public education, and state policy makers may respond by reducing higher education
funding. Therefore, the rate of out‐migration is hypothesized to display a negative relationship with
public expenditures on higher education.
The political party of the governor, PARTY i , controls for the possibility of different funding
priorities of the two major political parties. This is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor was
a Republican and 0 if the governor was a Democrat. If the election of a Republican governor results
in an increase in crime spending and a decrease in higher education spending, then the estimated
coefficient would be negative in the education spending equation and positive in the crime
spending equation.7
CRIME SPENDING EQUATION
Spending on higher education is included in the crime spending equation to test the hypothesis that
the two are interrelated in the public budget. A negative relation would suggest that increases in
higher education spending crowd out crime spending. A positive relation would suggest that
increased spending on higher education leads to higher spending on crime or that big spenders on

crime are also big spenders on higher education. No relationship would suggest no linkage between
the two programs.
The crime rate, CR i , and its change over the previous 3 years, CCR i , are hypothesized to exert
positive influences on crime spending. Higher crime rates and higher recent increases in crime
rates are expected to raise crime‐related spending as more resources are devoted to enforcement,
court costs, incarceration, and prevention areas of public spending. As crime rates rise, the public
may also demand higher expenditures; and given criminal codes and sentencing policies, greater
crime activity results in higher public crime‐related expenditures.
Dominance of crime‐related employees in the population, DOM i , controls for two possible effects on
spending. Relatively more employees should lead to higher payrolls and therefore higher spending
as well. Also, crime‐related employees are a special interest group with an interest in promoting
spending on crime‐related programs, and therefore they should represent a powerful pressure
group on the political process that determines public budgeting when their numbers are larger.
Both effects suggest a positive influence from DOM i , and therefore higher shares of crime‐related
employees are hypothesized to cause higher spending on crime‐related programs. Whereas the
average percentage of crime‐related employees in the population was 0.56 in 1992 (0.50 in 1985),
its range runs from a high of 0.85 (New York ) to a low of 0.34 (West Virginia). PARTY i is included
to control for the political party of the governor as discussed above in the education spending
equation.
CRIME RATE EQUATION
Crime‐related expenditures are hypothesized to exert an inverse influence on the crime rate, as
increased current expenditures on police protection and corrections are expected to reduce the
crime rate. Effects of past increases in crime expenditures are captured in the lagged crime rate.
The ethnic diversity of a state’s population, DIVERSE i , is hypothesized to influence crime rates,
based on the expectation that a more ethnically diverse population creates greater cultural conflicts
and tensions that result in higher crime rates than does a society with less diversity. The previous
year’s crime rate, CR i–1, is expected to exert a positive influence on the crime rate.
It is often asserted that poverty breeds crime, so median income is included in the crime rate
equation to capture cross‐state differences in income levels. It could also be the case that high‐
income states attract criminals, and so the expected sign on median income is indeterminate.
We hypothesize that the more youthful the population, the higher crime rates are, because a
disproportionate share of crimes are committed by juveniles and young adults. We include the
following population variables: MID1 i = percentage of population aged 18 to 24 and MID2 i =
percentage of population aged 25 to 44. Higher values of both variables are expected to raise crime
rates because a majority of crimes are committed within these age brackets. Median age,
MEDAGE i ,is used to control for differences in median ages across the states.
The civilian unemployment rate, UE i , is hypothesized to be positively related to crime rates
because, in those states with relatively fewer jobs, there may be a greater incentive for criminal
activity. Hoenack and Pierro (1990), Strathman (1994), and Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) found

that higher unemployment rates lower higher education spending. We hypothesize that the 3‐year
change in the unemployment rate, CUE i , exerts a positive influence on crime rates because the
higher a recent increase in unemployment, the greater the incentive for criminal activity. Use of
CUE i also controls for the fact that some states have persistently high or low unemployment rates,
as influenced by geographic or industrial characteristics, and therefore the very fact that a state has
a relatively high unemployment rate does not necessarily suggest the same event when some states
have persistently high unemployment rates and others have high unemployment rates that are
more transitory in nature.

ESTIMATION
The two‐stage least squares (TSLS) technique is used to estimate the spending equations and the
crime rate equation because each equation contains dependent variables as right‐hand‐side
variables. Estimation of simultaneous equations using ordinary least squares (OLS) produces
biased and inconsistent estimates of the coefficients. The simultaneity bias associated with OLS
usually results in an upward bias of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables. TSLS is
commonly used to mitigate the bias and avoid the inconsistency of OLS, and that is the estimation
technique used here.
Equations are estimated for 1992 and 1985, using i =1,2,...50 states. The latest year for which crime
data are available is 1992, and comparable data are available for 1985, so the time periods can be
easily compared. Significance of estimated coefficients is based on two‐tailed tests at the .01, .05,
and .10 levels. Data for EDEXP i , STUDENT i , and SCHOOLS i are obtained from the Digest of Education
Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics 1992, 1993). Data for Y i , EDUC i , METRO i ,CR i ,
CCR i ,UE i , and CUE i are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Department
of Commerce n.d.). Data for CRIME i and DOM i are obtained from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics (Bureau of Justice Statistics n.d.) and Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 1992
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 1997). Data on MEDAGE i , MID1 i , MID2 i , DIVERSITY i , and OUTRATE i
are obtained from U.S. Census population estimates.
Table 3 displays TSLS estimates of our three‐equation model for 1992 and 1985 data. Let us discuss
the first three columns, which display the estimates for 1992. Total crime spending has a negative
and significant effect on education spending, which is consistent with the crowding‐out hypothesis,
but education spending does not exert a statistically significant influence on crime‐related
spending. Therefore, the 1992 data suggest some support for the hypothesis that increases in
spending on crime‐related programs have led to a reduction in spending on higher education.
In the education spending equation, significant influences are crime‐related spending (negative)
and student share of the population (positive, as hypothesized). In the crime spending equation,
significant influences are the contemporaneous crime rate (positive, as hypothesized), the 1989 to
1992 change in the crime rate (negative), employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized), and the
party dummy variable (positive). The positive sign on the party dummy indicates that in states led
by Republican governors, crime‐related spending as a percentage of GSP was greater than in states
led by Democratic governors. Estimation of the crime rate equation indicates that the previous
year’s crime rate exerts a significant positive influence on the contemporaneous crime rate.

Interestingly, crime‐related spending does not exert a statistically significant contemporaneous
influence on the crime rate.
The last three columns of Table 3 display equation estimates for 1985. No evidence of any
relationship is found between higher education and crime‐related programs, and therefore no
support is shown for the hypothesis that increases in spending on crime‐related programs led to a
reduction in spending on higher education. In the education spending equation, the percentage of
the population living in metropolitan areas has a negative impact on education spending, the
student share of the population exerts a significant positive effect, and the rate of out‐migration has
a negative impact. In the crime spending equation, the contemporaneous crime rate is significant
and positive and employee dominance exerts a positive and significant influence, as hypothesized.
In the crime rate equation, significant influences are crime‐related spending (negative, as
hypothesized), the previous year’s crime rate (positive), income (negative), and the unemployment
rate (negative, contrary to expectations).
MODEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION–CORRECTIONS SPENDING
The argument that crime spending crowds out spending on higher education is often based on
recent growth in prisons and inmates. We now estimate our model with spending on corrections
(as a percentage of GSP) as a replacement for total crime‐related spending so that we can examine
whether this particular area of public spending crowds out spending on higher education. Spending
on corrections is a sizable portion of total spending, the magnitude of which varies across the
states. In 1992, the mean level of correctional spending was 0.41% of GSP and ranged from 0.19%
(West Virginia) to 0.70% (Florida). For 1985, the mean level of correctional spending was 0.29% of
GSP with a range of 0.13% (North Dakota) to 0.52% (Alaska). In contrast to the rise of 21% for total
crime‐related spending over this period, spending of corrections rose roughly 41% over this period
and therefore may potentially exert an impact that is stronger on higher education spending than
on total crime‐related spending.
Table 4 displays TSLS estimates of our three‐equation model for 1992 and 1985 data. The first
three columns display estimates for 1992. In the education spending equation, correction spending
and the rate of out‐migration exert negative influences on education spending and the student
population exerts a positive influence. The negative coefficient on corrections spending is
consistent with the crowding‐out hypothesis. In the corrections spending equation, significant
influences are the political party dummy variable (positive) and employee dominance(positive, as
hypothesized). Estimation of the crime rate equation indicates that the previous year’s crime rate
exerts a significant positive influence and the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 exerts a
negative influence (contrary to expectations).
The last three columns of Table 4 display equation estimates for 1985. The results are similar to
those for 1992. No evidence of any relationship is found between higher education and corrections
programs, and therefore no support is provided for the hypothesis that increases in spending on
corrections lead to a reduction in spending on higher education. In the education spending
equation, the percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas has a negative influence, the
student share of the population exerts a significant positive effect, and the rate of population out‐
migration has a significant negative effect. In the corrections spending equation, the

contemporaneous crime rate exerts a positive influence and employee dominance exerts a positive
and significant influence, as hypothesized. In the crime rate equation, significant influences are
income (negative), the previous year’s crime rate (positive), and the unemployment rate (negative,
contrary to expectations).
ESTIMATIONS USING PERCENTAGE CHANGES OVER THE 1985 TO 1992 PERIOD
Table 5 displays estimates of higher education spending, crime‐related spending, corrections
spending, and crime rate equations where these variables are measured as percentage changes
over the 1985 to 1992 period. These equations are estimated to determine how changes in these
variables over this time period influenced one another. Percentage changes in all explanatory
variables also replace their levels as used in the previous estimations. These models are another
approach to determining whether crime‐related spending crowded out spending on education over
this period. As noted earlier, the average level of public higher education spending fell as a
percentage of GSP over this period, as the average levels of both total crime and corrections
spending rose as percentages of GSP. Estimated relationships therefore will now contain two
dimensions, cross‐state and over time, and provide additional information on whether there is any
linkage between these programs. Because we are now considering changes across time, three
political party dummy variables must be included. For each state there are four possible outcomes
regarding the governorship. A state could have had Republican governors in both years, a
Democratic governor in both years, a Republican governor in 1985 and a Democratic governor in
1992, or a Democratic governor in 1985 and a Republican governor in 1992. Three dummy
variables are included in the estimated equations, with the possibility of Democratic governors in
both years the excluded case.
The first three columns display estimations of percentage changes in higher education spending as
a percentage of GSP, total crime‐related spending as a percentage of GSP, and the crime rate. The
percentage change in education spending and the percentage change in crime‐related spending do
not have significant influences on each other. In the education spending equation, the percentage
change in the student share of the population has a significant positive effect on education spending
and the percentage change in the rate of out‐migration has a negative effect. In the crime spending
equation, the percentage change in income has a negative effect on the percentage change in crime‐
related spending, and the percentage change in crime‐related employees as a share of the
population exerts a significant positive influence. In the crime rate equation, the previous year’s
crime rate exerts a significant positive influence.
The last three columns display estimations of percentage changes in education spending as a
percentage of GSP, corrections spending as a percentage of GSP, and the crime rate. Percentage
changes in neither spending program exert a significant influence on the other. In the education
spending equation, the percentage change in the student share of the population exerts a significant
positive effect on the percentage change in the share of education spending, and the percentage
change in the rate of out‐migration has a significant negative effect. In the corrections spending
equation, the percentage change in corrections‐related employees as a share of the population
exerts a significant positive influence. In the crime rate equation, significant influences are the

percentage change in the previous year’s crime rate (positive) and the percentage change in median
age (positive).
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF SPENDING
The equations were also estimated with alternative measures of public higher education spending
and crime spending. Instead of measuring these expenditures as percentages of GSP, higher
education spending per pupil and crime spending per capita were used. To save space, the full
results are not displayed, but we discuss the results for the crowding‐out issue, which is the major
focus of our study. For 1992, the results show no significant relationship between higher education
spending per student and crime‐related spending per capita. Corrections spending per capita does
not have a significant influence on education spending per student in 1992, but education spending
per pupil exerts a significant negative effect on corrections spending per capita. We also find that
the rate of out‐migration has a significant negative impact on higher education spending per pupil
when corrections spending is used in the model. Thus, for 1992, there is no evidence that crime
spending crowded out education spending per pupil.
For 1985, crime‐related spending per capita has no significant influence on education spending per
student, but education spending per pupil has a significant positive effect on crime‐related
spending per capita. When crime‐related spending is replaced with corrections spending,
corrections spending exerts a positive influence on education spending, and higher education
spending has a significant positive impact on corrections spending per capita. For 1985, there is no
evidence that higher education spending per student was crowded out by crime spending. The
results indicate states that spent relatively large amounts on crime also spent relatively large
amounts on higher education.
When the equations are estimated with the variables measured as percentage changes between
1985 and 1992, neither higher education spending per pupil nor crime‐related spending per capita
exerts a significant influence on the other. No significant relationship is found between higher
education spending per student and corrections spending per capita. Taken together, these results
using alternative measures of higher education spending and crime spending display no evidence
that increased crime spending per capita crowded out higher education spending per student.

CONCLUSIONS
Our empirical analysis provides weak evidence that crime‐related programs have crowded out
spending on higher education. Evidence of crowding out of education spending by both total crime
spending and corrections spending is found for 1992, when these expenditures are measured as
percentages of GSP; but no evidence is found for 1985 or for the period from 1985 to 1992 as a
whole. But the crowding‐out hypothesis is not supported by our findings when higher education
spending is measured by expenditures per pupil and crime‐related and corrections spending are
measured as expenditure per capita. Also, as our testing indicates, no significant negative
interrelationships are found over the 1985 to 1992 period for any of these programs, and therefore
neither side of the spending debate can reasonably claim strong and consistent evidence that its

spending plans are always impeded by what success the other program experiences in its spending
budget.
We conclude with the caveat that, because our evidence is based on the 1985 to 1992 period and
therefore does not cover a period in which states were implementing three strikes–type legislation,
future relationships between spending on higher education and on crime‐related programs may
change to one wherein crowding out consistently occurs. This may be consistent with the empirical
results that show some crowding out in 1992 but not in 1985, because the largest relative increases
in spending on crime‐related programs occurred nearer the end of the 1985 to 1992 period. Of
course, it is possible that the increases in crime and corrections spending had a greater negative
impact on budget categories of public spending other than expenditures at public institutions of
higher education. For example, social services budgets and public spending on recreation may have
experienced more severe reductions in spending than higher education, but whether they actually
did is a question for future research to determine.

NOTES
1. See, for example, Barr (1995) for a discussion of the possible impacts of California’s “three
strikes and you are out” law on education spending.
2. For example, California’s Proposition 98 guarantees that schools and community colleges
receive a minimum amount of revenue from state and local property taxes. The allocation
guarantee is based on a formula involving enrollment changes and projections of state tax
revenues.
3. Notice that the connection between education spending and program quality is ambiguous, as
higher education spending could simply reflect higher compensation for school personnel, but it
could also reflect higher quality programs. However, for our purposes, we are only interested in
education spending because this appears to be the focus of the crime‐education debate.
4. We have included student to control for the demand for higher education under the assumption
that this variable reflects voter demand for maintaining or raising existing levels of higher
education spending. We predict then that higher values of student lead to higher spending,
either as a share of GSP or per student. There is, however, an endogeneity concern when higher
spending states foster a larger student body because they offer higher quality programs and/or
lower tuition. In this case, larger values of dependent variables (spending) may lead to higher
values of student.
5. There is some evidence that past school district consolidation has not exploited scale
economies. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) found that numbers of school districts in states are
always substantially greater than numbers that would be predicted based solely on attempts to
gain greater scale economies.
6. We have not included spending of private universities of higher education because it is not
entirely clear what effect such spending would have on public spending on higher education. It
is unclear, for instance, whether state legislatures consider private spending on higher
education when they set public budgets on higher education. Moreover, the degree to which
private universities are educating students from out of state is unclear, and substantial
variation is likely to exist across states in the degree to which private universities educate
within‐state students.
7. The authors are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this variable.
8. Details of the two‐stage least squares (TSLS) procedures can be found in most standard
econometrics textbooks.
9. We also estimated the equations with the rate of population immigration included as an
explanatory variable. It is not included in the results because the rate of in‐migration was not
found to be statistically significant in any of the equations and its inclusion had no effect on the
results reported in the article.
10. Note that, rather than the total number of crime‐related employees, this variable is the number
of employees in corrections as a percentage of the population.
11. Unlike the estimations with education as a share of gross state product (GSP), income displays a
positive and significant influence on education per pupil for both years and for both total justice
spending and corrections spending equations.
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